While most of the quantitative literature on quality of government involving European countries has focused on national differences, sub-national variation has been neglected, mainly due to the lack of data. This paper explores sub-national divergences in quality of government (understood as control of corruption, impartial treatment of citizens and government effectiveness) in three major policy areas (law enforcement, health and education) for more than 70 European regions. We address the question of why regions which share so many formal institutions (e.g. Northern and Southern Italy) do diverge so much in quality of government. We propose two hypotheses to explain such variation. First, similar to recent political economy literature, the paper underlines the importance of informal institutions historically transmitted. Yet, unlike this scholarship, the paper argues that it is not different cultural values (e.g. "generalized trust") what explains regional path dependencies, but the persistence of patrimonial clientelistic networks created in those regions with historically unconstrained rulers. Second, we test the impact of contemporary political institutions that represent the level to which governments regions share power. The empirical analysis shows strong evidence for our first hypothesis; that those regions that constrained executives' attempts to build clientelistic networks during the 17 th -19 th centuries exhibit significantly higher levels of quality of government today, controlling for standard political, cultural and socio-economic indicators.
Introduction
According to a large number of studies, "quality of government" is a key factor for understanding the economic and social development of a country (for a summary, see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009 ). Yet what is understood by "quality of government" in the literature? Empirically, "quality of government" is frequently proxied for outcome indicators (no formal legal codes) regarding the "quality" (no the "quantity") of the policies delivered by a government: e.g. control of corruption, prevalence of the rule of law, government effectiveness or protection of property rights. Since all these cross-country indicators tend to be highly correlated -irrespective of the type of data and the methodology employed to collect them -the literature has noted that "it makes sense to talk about the quality of government as a general feature of countries" (Tabellini 2007) . Theoretically, an influential account of what unites lack of corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness is the one posed by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) : quality of government (QoG) is when governments treat all individuals in an impartial way irrespective of their social, economic, political, cultural or ethnic position.
A large body of cross-country evidence suggests the (positive) negative effects of an (im)partial government. For instance, corruption, by serving as an illegal tax that distorts the economy, has negative consequences for GDP growth (Mauro 1995 , Mo 2001 , income inequality and poverty (Gupta et al. 2002) , various health and education issues (Mauro 1998; Transparency International 2006; Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009) and reduces investments both from abroad and from inside the country (Levchenko 2007) . When government is partial to particular groups in society, it undermines the trust people have in their government and reduces the well-being of the excluded groups (Rothstein and Eek 2009) . Low QoG can also lead to a lower environmental quality by tolerating illegal dumping of toxic waste, producing lower quality water, or merely through environmentally damaging policy decisions (Damania 2003; Welsch 2004) . All these can contribute to making a society less economically developed, more dangerous and unhealthy for its residents than it could have been otherwise (Saviano 2008) .
As a result of these findings, many "horse races" have taken place amongst multitude of legal, cultural, social, economic and political factors which could explain why some countries exhibit systematically higher/lower levels of QoG (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997 , 1999 , Treisman 2000 , 2007 Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; Keefer 2007; Charron and Lapuente 2010 ). Yet, so far, comparative research in QoG has almost exclusively focused on national differences. Despite the large anecdotic evidence and single-country studies pointing out the importance of within-country differences in quality of government-e.g . between Northern and Southern Italy, across U.S. States or within India -, comparing the levels of quality of government in regions in a multicountry context remains largely unexplored. The few notable exceptions of cross-regional comparisons (e.g. Tabellini 2005) deal theoretically with quality of government issues, but lack empirical indexes at regional level, using instead economic indicators as proxies for regional governmental performance.
This paper aims at bridging that gap by exploring regional differences in QoGunderstood , like in the cross-national literature, as control of corruption, impartial treatment of citizens, and government effectiveness -in three major policy areas -law enforcement, health and education -for which data has been gathered. In particular, the paper uses a perception-based indicator of QoG built from a 34,000-respondents survey from 172 regions within 18 EU member states from (reference deleted for anonymity).
Section 2 shows how the regional QoG indicator was constructed and the validity tests it was subject to. Section 2 also provides some basic descriptive findings. The data shows, in the first place and in accordance with the cross-national literature (e.g. Besley and Persson 2007) , that government performance characteristics are highly correlated. Having a low corrupt government in a particular area (e.g. education) goes hand in hand with having an effective government in another area (e.g. law and enforcement). Thus, similar to the comparative cross-country literature, this paper remarks that, in the light of the data explored here, it makes sense to talk about quality of government as a general feature of European regions.
Secondly, the data shows how cross-regional differences in QoG often trump out cross-national ones -e.g. high quality regions in Northern Italy enjoy levels of QoG as high as regions in Germany or Austria while those in the South most resemble lowperforming regions in the New Member States. In addition, one can see how crossregional differences exist both within decentralized countries, but also within centralized Section 3 advances the theoretical proposition of the paper to explain variations in quality of government. Similar to a recent trend in comparative literature, this paper considers that historical factors are major determinants of today's governmental performance (La Porta et al. 1997 , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001 , Tabellini 2005 , 2007 . In particular, following Tabellini's (2005 Tabellini's ( , 2007 pioneering analysis of sub-national variations in economic performance, we argue that past government institutions may have left a legacy in the posterior functioning of government institutions -i.e. not so much in the formal rules of the game, but in the informal rules of the game. Yet, while Tabellini and other earlier culturalist scholars (e.g. Banfield 1958 , Putnam 1993 argue that it is through cultural values -that is, by creating individuals with better/worse moral valuesthat past institutions affect the performance of current government institutions, this paper proposes an alternative mechanism that does not require different -and problematicassumptions of individual morality. the main proposition of this paper -that the historical absence of executive constraints negatively affects today's quality of government Section 4 tests-vis-à-vis the main standard explanations in the literature on crossregional differences -and, most greater number of observations, thus reducing the uncertainty around the estimates. The use of the WGI also allows the inclusion of the 9 smaller E.U. countries excluded from the sub-national survey. For the best comparison, the WGI were used as the country mean and the regional survey provides the variation around that mean. In some cases, such as Italy, Spain, Romania and Belgium, this variation is substantial, while in others, such as Denmark, Netherlands, Poland or Slovakia, the variation around the WGI estimate is insignificant.
In constructing the regional level data, it was followed the advice of the "Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators" (2008) from the OECD and JRC. After internal consistency checks and tests at both the individual and aggregate regional levels, correlations and factor analysis determined the survey questions on QoG which would be used to build the regional QoG index. Margins of error were constructed for each region (95%) to account for the level of uncertainty of each regional estimate. Extensive sensitivity tests were done on both the WGI and the regional QoG survey index to test for robustness. 3 Therefore, it can confidently be argued that the data is internally consistent and robust to alterations in the weights or aggregation. It is important to note that it was found that the exclusion of any one underlying indicator does not change the results of either the national or regional assessment in any meaningful way (reference deleted for anonymity).
The data is standardized with an EU mean of '0' and a standard deviation of '1' such that higher values equal higher QoG. An examination of figure 1, which displays the descending rank-order of all 27 E.U. countries in QoG, elucidates some puzzles that this paper aims to address. On the contrary, this paper argues that institutionalism can mostly explain subnational differences if we take into account two premises: a broad definition of institutionalism and broad empirical proxies. Firstly, while formal institutions remain frequently the same across sub-national units within a country, informal institutions, such as the patronage networks we describe below (hypothesis 1), may critically change.
Secondly, institutionalist explanations recurrently fail empirical contrast because they use a single variable as a proxy and for a short span of time, but using several proxies for the same theoretical mechanism and for an accumulated period of time, as this paper does (hypothesis 2), allows us to detect some slow-moving, yet significant, institutional effects.
Theory: explaining regional variations in quality of government
Which variable/s -other than political institutions -can change from region and thus constitute the basis for an explanation of the divergent regional levels of QoG? This section develops two institutionalist hypotheses, one based on past political institutions and the other in current political institutions. These hypotheses are based, but also significantly depart, from existing views on what produces quality of government.
Before elaborating on our hypotheses, we disuses two leading alternative explanations of why QoG may vary from region to region.
Historical Institutions Hypotheses
There are two, yet non-mutually exclusive types of accounts in the existing recent literature that provide not-strictly institutionalist answers to historical differentials across cities, regions or countries in QoG which could be referred to as the "equality theory" and the "culturalist theory." They offer important insights that are up to certain extent corroborated here. Further, this paper builds upon the insights of both the equality and the culturalist approaches to QoG, but aims at providing a testable proposition with more concrete micro-foundations on why individuals within the governmental institutions in a region have more incentives than others to deliver policies, public goods and services in a more impartial way than others.
Both approaches base their analyses on a key empirical finding: that, as increasingly shown by numerous studies, being Robert Putnam's (1993) probably one of earlier and most influential ones, high performing regions in terms of QoG, democracy or economic development also tend to be high performing in some key social characteristics (Zak and Knack 2001; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) . These regions also exhibit high levels of "social trust" -that is, with levels generalized trust -i.e. trust in strangers or people who do not belong to "your group". On the contrary, regions in the lower end of the scale in terms of QoG or economic development tend also to show high levels of particularized (in-group) trust and low levels of generalized trust. Not only this, but also anti-social norms, ranging from not poor observation of basic traffic rules to not using properly public bins, are also seen as more prevalent in the latter group of regions, according to the qualitative findings of a report on QoG in the E.U. (Charron, Lapuente, Rothstein 2010) . Or, as intuitively, Tabellini (2007, 3) points out, "while blocking traffic in a highway is widely considered a natural and legitimate form of political protest in countries like Italy or France, it would scarcely be tolerated by public opinion in Sweden or the US." That is, "good" (or "bad") governmental, economic and social (i.e. "trust") characteristics cluster together consolidating virtuous or vicious circles. Despite these common features, the equality and the culturalist theories differ in how these clusters emerge, leading to noteworthy different normative prescriptions.
"Equality Theory" Explanations
In the first place, these clusters have been explained, explicitly or implicitly, with references to what comparativist scholars (e.g. Pierson 2000) call feedback mechanisms or increasing returns between socio-political variables. An early example of the "equality theory" would be Boix and Posner's (1998: 687) argument that the level of social capital in a region to be the "degree of social and political inequality that the community has experienced over the course of its historical development." Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) offer a more developed version of the equality argument. They describe how feedback mechanisms among key governmental and social variables make countries enter virtuous (or vicious) cycles in key societal and governmental variables. Government policies, such as universal welfare benefits and impartial polities, would lead to the development of a stronger sense of social solidarity within a community and generalized trust. In turn, this higher social engagement and cohesion would make policy-making and implementation easier through informal norms for contributing to the provision of public goods, such as, for instance, respecting basic rules, paying taxes, protecting public spaces or engaging in social activism to demand the response of public authorities to common problems of the community.
On the contrary, following Rothstein and Uslaner, a vicious cycle would emerge in those polities where corrupt, partial and inefficient governmental policies precludes the sense of social solidarity and spurs particularized trust at the expense of generalized trust.
Where "people have faith only in their in-group" -understanding by it either a family, a clan, an ethnic group or other social groupings such as a political party -a society, and thus its politics, is "seen as a zero-sum game between conflicting groups" (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, 45-46) . In these conditions, citizens feel less attached to their political communities than to a particular social group and thus less eager to contribute to the provision of general public goods, such as paying taxes, respecting and protecting public spaces and, very importantly, engaging in social and political mobilizations asking for improvements in quality of government. Generally speaking, free-riding becomes more frequent at all social levels. In turn, public authorities lack both adequate resources and incentives to deliver policies, consolidating a vicious spiral.
Despite the plausibility of its mechanisms and, as we will see below, its relative accuracy in describing what the relationships among these variables in European regions, this theory of virtuous/vicious spirals or clusters lacks a proper explanation on why historically some polities entered in a positive o negative spiral to start with. We thus seek to fill that theoretical gap. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) do however offer a tentative answer by pointing out to the relative historically higher levels of both economic equality and equality of opportunity (i.e. an impartial government that does not discriminate among citizens) in those countries (e.g. late 19 th century Nordic countries)
consolidating later on virtuous cycles than in those trapped in vicious ones. Economic equality and an impartial government are the two factors standing at the beginning of their theoretical causal chain (ibid. 44).
However, we lack larger-N studies confirming that it is not a few particular cases (e.g. Scandinavian countries) that are driving the results in Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) .
More importantly, we lack testable propositions containing precise micro-foundations on why some polities entered one path or the other. Which type of equality and, under which circumstances matters the most for triggering virtuous cycles? The theory of this paper agrees with the importance that Rothstein and Uslaner give to historical factors creating path-dependencies and with their implicit institutions-based (unlike the most prevailing culture-based approaches) view that social trust. It is more appropriate to see better government as leading to high social trust than vice versa. Yet, despite they show the reinforcing effects of these macro-variables -that is, that they have clustered historically and cluster nowadays -the main authors of what we refer to as the "equality theory" cannot disregard why some countries, if it is not as a result of relatively high levels of social trust, were able to provide relatively high levels of quality of government at the end of the 19 th century.
"Cultural Theory" Explanations
A second strand of accounts on why some regions have historically higher QoG than others is the culturalist view. From a more sociological point of view, highly influential proponents of the importance of some cultural values would include the classic works by Banfield (1958) , Putnam (1993 ) or Fukuyama (1995 . Recent works by economists, like Glaeser et al. (2004) and Tabellini (2005 Tabellini ( , 2007 , have also adopted a cultural turn for understanding differentials in economic development. "Culture", instead of "institutions", would be the mechanism through which history affects current level of social trust) for explaining cross-regional difference in economic development.
Going backwards, he finds that social capital variables are the result of historically high levels of education in the region and a large number of constraints on the executives governing those regions from 1600 onwards.
Tabellini (2007) broadens the analysis empirically -by looking at worldwide cross-national differences -and offers a more accurate theoretical argument surrounding the idea of morality. The "conceptions of what is right and wrong" vary from a geographical area to another (as a result of historical legacies, and very particularly of the area being subjected to more or less despotic powers historically) and they explain the different functioning of political and bureaucratic organizations, setting better or worse 13 conditions for economic development. In some areas (i.e. those which exhibit high levels of social trust) what is right is a "generalized morality": the norms of good conduct apply to all individuals. In other areas (i.e. those which exhibit low levels of social trust) what is right is a "limited morality": the norms of good conduct apply only to the narrow group with which the individual identifies. While the former morality prevents free riding, the latter fosters it: cheating on taxes if you are a taxpayer, accepting bribes if you are bureaucrat, or tolerating corrupt elected officials if you are a voter, are all more acceptable behaviours in societies with a prevailing "limited morality" (Tabellini 2007, 8) . In turn, these moral values are transmitted across generations, with the accumulated result of higher quality of government in those polities with "generalized morality".
Despite the use of instrumental variables to control for endogeneity issues and the remarkable empirical findings by Tabellini (2005 Tabellini ( , 2007 both for explaining national and regional differences, it is difficult to theoretically sustain an explanation of the sort that "better" people leads to a "better" quality of government. It is plausible to suspect the existence of an omitted variable explaining both the consolidation of certain moral values as well as quality of government. To build a more satisfactory theory, one should aim at finding a variable that would not force us to assume (even if implicitly) that that you simply have different types of individuals in different regions or that the utility functions of individuals significantly differ from one region to another. That is the goal of this section and we proceed in two steps: first, a brief empirical visualization of the empirical relationships predicted by the cluster and the culturalist approaches for the regional sample gathered in this paper; and, second, the formulation of our hypothesis.
In Figure 2 we take a broad look at QoG in relation to two of the major social, political and economic variables pointed out in the abovementioned literature. Figure 2 partially validates the accounts by authors of the cluster or the culturalist approaches to QoG. In general, there seems to be a statistical relationship among a major political variable (the EU regional QoG index), a major economic one (regional income) and a major social one (social trust at regional level). Yet there are some noteworthy 
Our Contribution -'Past Executive Constraints and Clientalistic Networks'
This paper does not argue that worse performing regions have worse (in moral terms) individuals. We assume individuals have similar morality, but they are exposed to different sets of incentives in different regions as a consequence of the network effects created by historical institutions. Following the mostly qualitative works by administrative historians, starting with Shefter's (1977 Shefter's ( , 1994 pioneering studies, we focus our attention in the historical process of emergence of patronage and clientelistc networks. The reason is that, once a structure for delivering clientelistic or patronage jobs is in place, it leads to the "pliability of the structures of public-decision making to particularistic considerations" (Piattoni 2001: 17) . In other words, early patronageclientelistic networks set path-dependencies that dissuade off-equilibrium behavior.
Using the example of farmers pointed out by Chandra (2007: 87) , if politicians have the discretionary power to give certificates of eligibility to farmers in order to apply for a 15 subsidy, even impartially passed laws -i.e. with objective conditions to grant subsidiesmay become instruments of patronage politics.
These clientelistic networks distributed patronage jobs in the public sector and public procurement contracts and, in general, emphasized the delivery of targeted private goods at the expense of non-targeted public policies. For example, a patronage network per excellence, like that of the 19 th century Spanish caciques could control almost all jobs within a given territory, "from night watchman to judge" (Carr, 1980: 11) . Once created, these networks set a path dependency which affected the choices not only of those actors initially involved, but of future generations. Namely, if individuals of the current generation see clientelistic contacts to deliver higher payoffs than merit in former generations, they adjust their investments in human capital accordingly: e.g. it is not so important to study hard a subject or how to set up a business as to establish the right are diverted from other investments in human capital -to the two activities which enhance the most the chances of better livelihood and status according to Chandra: in case they possess enough economic and social capital, individuals will enter political careers themselves and, in case they lack those capitals, individuals will try to obtain access to those controlling key state resources. In those societies where "virtually everyone" is recommended to any job by some patron -using Chubb's (1981: 114) description of Palermo -, being outside a patronage network -either in power or inwaiting -involves too many individual costs for the citizens of the region.
As a result, the region will be dominated by an "overwhelming preoccupation (2007) argues. A political party willing to move from a highly particularized provision of public services to an impartial delivery would need to fight, first, the opposition of their core constituencies, whose "vested rights" to the share of the spoils would be frustrated; and, second, a credibility problem with the rest of voters, who would remain skeptical of larger reforms after a long history of
patronage.
Yet we lack large-N empirical assessments of up to which extent they do affect contemporary government outcomes -especially when controlling for other alternative factors. In order to do so, we need testable propositions that allow us to predict why some regions in Europe ended up creating those enduring patronage networks. patron-client relationships develop because some individuals accumulate extraordinary levels of power regarding most other members of the community. Our hypothesis is that the closer a region has been historically to that ideal of "dueño del pueblo" -that is, power without external constraints -the more likely an informal institution of "patronage network" to have survived across time, producing a constant deviation of public activity from impartiality to a particularistic delivery of public jobs, goods and services. The hypothesis would thus state as follows:
H1: The more constraints on the executive a region has historically experienced, the less likely patronage networks have consolidated for the distribution of particularized public goods, and, as a result, the higher the current regional level of quality of government.
*** Figure 3 about here*** Figure 3 demonstrates the bivariate relationship between historical executive constraints and regional levels of QoG for 73 EU regions. As is the case with social trust and economic development in Figure 2 , we find a strong and significant positive relationship between the two variables, suggesting initial evidence for H1. Moreover, all but a handful of low-QoG Italian regions fit into the 95% confidence interval around the linear prediction between historical constraints and contemporary regional QoG. What this shows in addition is that contemporary executive constraints is not an appropriate instrument variable for 'trust' Tabellini's QoG-trust model, as he argues is the correct specification, due to the fact that it is so highly correlated with current levels of QoG, thus his model is miss-specified.
Contemporary Institutions Hypothesis
Despite the fact that we have argued the main hypothesis of the paper regards historical institutions, a full institutionalist explanation should also take into account the importance of contemporary political institutions. For instance, as several authors have noted, how we select (i.e. characteristics of the electoral system) political incumbents may matter Lapuente 2010, Lapuente and Nistotskaya 2009), the premise of this paper is that QoG requires constant and large investments of public resources -e.g. to keep a meritocratic recruitment system, to create politically isolated administrative corps. The costs of those investments are obvious for politicians at short term (e.g. they lose potential patronage jobs), but politicians can only benefit from them at medium-long term: when voters note the improvement in the delivery of public services of a patronage-free administration.
Ruling parties with short time horizons or with little power will be unwilling and/or unable to undertake those investments in QoG. That is, when a new governmental agency is created, they will have relatively high incentives to satisfy short-term party goals through it. On the contrary, the higher the accumulation of power a ruling party haseither intertemporally or intratemporally -, the more likely it is that the party finds electorally profitable to marginally invest in good governance instead of marginally satisfy short-term core constituencies' demands. Therefore, our second hypothesis would thus state as follows:
H2: Within long-established democracies, the less fragmented the political power both inter-temporally -i.e. the same party has been in power for long -as well as intratemporally -i.e. single party government -in a sub-national unit is, the higher its level of quality of government.
Data, Sample and Methods

Dependent Variable
As explained earlier, we employ the E.U. QoG Index variable from (reference deleted for anonymity), which is available for all 27 countries and 172 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions in the European Union for the year of 2009. The variable is standardized within E.U.
(mean of '0' and standard deviation of '1'), such that higher scores equal higher levels of QoG. Among the regions within the sample employed here (all come from E.U. -15 states), the range is from -2.53 (ITF3 -Campania) up to 1.59 (NL1 -Nord Nederland), thus spanning over three full standard deviations in the data.
Independent Variables
Our independent variables of note capture three broad aspects of each region: first, the historical levels of executive constraints -capturing hypothesis 1; second, several variables reflecting the current political institutions in place in the European regionsproxies for hypothesis 2; and third, the level of social trust -which, according to the "equality" and "culturalist" theories, reinforces QoG by virtue of having individuals with more generalized instead of particularized values and would be the main mechanism through which past institutions affect contemporary QoG.
As noted in the paper in which this data is presented, "a remarkable feature of European history is that regions now belonging to the same country were ruled by very different political institutions in the distant past" (Tabellini 2005: 17) . The key independent variable capturing the historical opportunities to develop patronage networks is the constraints on the executive (CONSTRAINTS) from 1600-1850, the last year -for which data is available -before all countries in the sample were unified (measured in 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850). This variable is taken from the pioneering study of regional differences by Tabellini (2005).
The variable is based on criteria from POLITY IV and builds on similar work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) . 4 The number of checks on a regional executive is a function of the strength of a representative legislature and/or independent judiciary. CONSTRAINTS is available for 72 regions in a limited number of E.U. 15
states and is a limited categorical variable that ranges from [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , with higher numbers indicating more constraints on the executive. A value of '1' for example indicates no constraints on the executive, and in which case the rule at this time was more or less an absolutist monarch, while a '7' corresponds to essentially a consolidated democracy, in which "accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most activity". Because certain regions in some countries like Italy or Spain for example, experience diachronic variation in executive constraints that is different than other regions of their country today, while other countries, like the Netherlands, have completely homogeneous regional change, we take employ Tabellini's 'pc_institutions'
variable, which combines all five data points and takes the first principle component of the five time points on executive constraints. It ranges from -2.09 to 3.58.
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We control for several alternative explanations -or, to be more precise, complementary -explanations, since the arguments of the "equality", "culturalist" and our "networks" theories are similar in underlining the role of historical path dependencies. One significant difference is that while our proposal is more institutionalist -i.e. past political institutions, through other mediating institutions between society and the state (e.g. patronage party-machines, caciques), affect QoG -both the equality and the culturalist approaches emphasize the mediating role of individual values -in particular, of how prevailing generalized trust is. Therefore, we test whether recent estimates of social trust have a significant impact on QoG, taken also from Tabellini (2005). Social trust (TRUST) is measured as the percentage of respondents who answer that "Most people can be trusted" (the other two answers being "Can't be too careful"
and "Don't know") to the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", from the World Value Surveys, (Inglehart et al. 2000) . Tabellini takes the data from two waves of the survey -1990-91 and 1995-97 -and Table 1 summarizes the availability of each of the variables within the sample.
As far as non-political standard controls, we include an indicator of economic development, as measured by regional PPP per capita (logged) from Eurostat, taken as the ten-year average from [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] (2005), there is also strong empirical evidence to suggest that CONSTRAINTS is a significant determinant of present day GDP in a region. On this potential problem of multicollinearity and endogeneiy between two independent variables in our analyses, we run models that include and exclude GDP when we test for the effects of CONSTRAINTS, as the multicollinearity between these two variables will likely render the standard errors of the estimates of CONSTRAINTS (along with GDP) less efficient.
Sample
Although data is available for QoG in 172 regions in the E.U., the indicator for political constraints in the 19 th century are available for only 73 regions, all from E.U. -15 countries 6 . In all, regions from eight different countries -Austria, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium U.K. and Portugal -are included at times in the sample.
However, when testing for the relevance of contemporary political institutions, only the "politically relevant" regions that have regional elections at the NUTS level of interest have such data, therefore, the Netherlands, U.K. and Portugal are excluded from these models (while Austria and former East German Länder are included), reducing the sample size from 73 to 66. When TRUST is included, Austria and former East German
Länder also drop out, reducing the sample size to 51. Table 1 summarizes the availability of data for each set of variables and the regions/countries that are included.
*** Table 1 about here***
Results
In table 1 we examine the effects of past political institutions on current day QoG in 73 regions, controlling for economic development, population and whether a region is a capital region or not along with TRUST. Moreover we test for the country fixed effects in the last two models, which remove the effect of the common, contemporary national institutions shared by regions within a country that are not included in the regression.
Thus we test both the effects of historical political constraints on regions on whole throughout the EU-15, and their impact on regions within the countries themselves. Table 2 displays the results.
*** Table 2 about here***
We begin with a simple baseline model of hypothesis 1 that we ran in Figure 1 and add controls in the second model. The initial results seem to corroborate our hypothesis 1 that historical constraints on the executive play a significant role in explaining variance in regional QoG today. For example, the baseline model indicates that CONSTRAINTS, significant at the 99% level of confidence, explains about one third of the total variance in the dependent variable (R² is 0.33). We find that even when adding the level of economic development, population and whether a region contains the capital city or not, the impact of CONSTRAINTS remains highly significant and the coefficient remains largely the same. The estimate show that a one unit increase in CONSTRAINTS results in a 0.24 increase in QoG, or about 25% of one full standard deviation of the dependent variable, holding al other variables constant. In the next five models, we take each year of the combined CONSTRAINTS variable from models 1 and 2 one at a time. We do this to test whether one or two time periods in particular are driving the results. We find this not too be the case, as each of the five time periods of executive constraints is a significant predictor of contemporary levels of regional QoG. However, the strongest effects seem to be from that latest two time periods -1800 and 1850.
In the final three models, we test the robustness of the results by including TRUST and adding country fixed effects. We find that the effects CONSTRAINTS are not at all reduced by adding TRUST into the model, yet TRUST is insignificant both with and without country fixed effects in the models. In the later two models, the impact of CONSTRAINTS on QoG is roughly half (to 0.13 down from 0.24 in model 2) when taking into consideration the fixed country effects, yet the variable of interest remains significant at the 95% and 90% confidence respectively in the last two models in Table 2 , demonstrating strong robust evidence that both within and across countries, historical constraints on the executive in European regions play a key role in explaining variation of QoG at the regional level today.
*** Table 3 about here***
In Table 3 we test the relationship between present day political institutions (hypothesis 2) and QoG. It is important to note that in this sample, only regions that have elected governments are employed. In general, we seek to understand whether the degree of accumulation vs. fragmentation of powers plays a role in determining levels of quality of government. As mentioned above, we proxy accumulation of political power with institutions such as the proportion of years a region has been governed by a single party, a minority government, the electoral threshold, how long the current party/coalition in power has been governing and the electoral threshold. All of these are either direct or indirect measures of accumulation of powers, power-sharing or veto players.
The empirical evidence from models [1] [2] [3] [4] suggest that regions with more accumulation of powers -i.e. fewer veto players or less power-sharing -perform, on average, better with respect to QoG. For example, SINGLE PARTY, CONSECUTIVE and THRESHOLD, all significant determinants of levels of QoG, suggest that regions which produce more single party governments on average, have longer tenured governments, and have higher barrier to entry for smaller parties perform better on average. In model 6, when all four institutions are regressed together, we find that SINGLE PARTY and THRESHOLD still play a significant role, and continue to do so even when accounting for past historical constraints on the executive in model 7. Partisanship however plays no role in explaining levels of QoG across EU regions.
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In the final models, we account for fixed country effects. The results here show that differences in modern data political institutions within countries do not play a significant role in determining variation in regional QoG. This suggests that certain types of political institutions or patterns in power-sharing/veto players cluster within certain countries. However, the CONSTRAINTS variable remains a significant determinant of QoG in all three models where we include it-both with and without country fixed effects and with and without directly accounting for regional GDP levels. Thus we find that while modern day political institutions and power sharing is important across regions throughout the EU, these differences become negligible within countries (when taking into account country fixed effects). However, the legacy of power-sharing networks as measured by historical constrains on the executive at the regional level has strong and robust impact on current levels of QoG.
How can one know that the variable "past institutions" acts through a mechanism of "patronage networks", as claimed in this paper, and not through a mechanism of "trust", as argued by the culturalist approach to QoG (e.g. Tabellini 2005). We cannot totally rule out the possibility that "trust" is the "missing link" to which Tabellini refers to, connecting past institutions with contemporary ones. However, as shown by the strong and robust empirical relationship between CONSTRAINTS and QoG, past executive constraints are not an appropriate instrument for Tabellini's model. Further, as the material explored in this paper shows -preliminarily in the relatively low correlation between social trust and regional QoG in Figure 2 and more extensively in the analysis presented in this section -recent levels of TRUST do not have the same explanatory power as CONSTRAINTS. In other words, at least in relation to the value of "generalized trust", it does not seem that having individuals with better values is what leads to higher levels of QoG in a region.
Conclusions
The contribution of this paper to the literature is mostly explanatory, by addressing the question of why some regions perform better than others in terms of QoG. In order to
provide an account as encompassing as possible, this paper uses pioneering cross-time dataset in which a large number of political, cultural, socio-economic and historical 28 variables have been collected for a large number of European regions -that varies between 172 in the broadest analysis to 51 in the narrowest -and for a significant period of time -with historical variables from 1600 onwards and contemporary political factors from 1970s onwards.
Similar to Tabellini (2010) , one important finding is that historical factors (e.g.
the existence of a historical tradition of "constraints on the executive" in place in the region already in the 18 th -19 th centuries) seem to matter for explaining nowadays differences across EU regions. Unlike Tabellini, who explores differences in economic performance, our dependent variable is a (perception-based) measure of QoG. In this regard, this paper provides a new empirical angle to a literature on regional differences which emphasizes qualitative differences between regions -e.g. Northern vs. Southern
Italy, Wallonie vs. Flanders -but which lacked quantitative encompassing measures of QoG across both countries and regions. The general map of QoG emerging from this data seems to confirm most of this previous literature, with very important divergences in how citizens in different regions perceive the quality, impartiality and lack of corruption of the public administrations they encounter daily. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature on quality of government, it can be argued that such variation has important implications on the economic and social progress of lesser-developed areas within the Union.
The paper develops two hypotheses, one regarding historical political institutions and the other regarding contemporary. The first hypothesis, on the negative effects of a past of unconstrained executives over contemporary levels of QoG via the survival of "patronage networks" seems to be more firmly corroborated in the empirical analysis.
The second hypothesis, on the positive effects of accumulation of powers at sub-national level in democratic settings, is conditional to country effects and thus is only moderately confirmed. We find strong support for H1, and support for H2 across the entire sample.
However, when taking country fixed effects into consideration, contemporary powersharing institutions cannot explain within-country regional variation of QoG. Yet, at the same time, by showing that both synchronic and diachronic accumulation of power has a positive (and sometimes significant) effect over QoG, the paper makes a contribution to a literature that has generally claimed the opposite. FR94   GR1   GR2   GR3   GR4  HU1   HU2  HU3  ITC1   ITC2   ITC3  ITC4   ITD1   ITD2   ITD3   ITD4   ITD5  ITE1   ITE2   ITE3   ITE4   ITF1   ITF2   ITF3   ITF4   ITF5   ITF6   ITG1   ITG2   NL1   NL2  NL3  NL4   PL11  PL12  PL21   PL22   PL31 PL32 PL33  PL34 PL41  PL42  PL43 
